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PROPERTY IN-LAWS
NICOLE STELLE GARNETT

In response to Eduardo Moisis Pefialver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1095 (2007).
I am a descendant of property outlaws. In 1856, my great-greatgreat grandfather Robert Fowler, an English immigrant, moved his
family to the Cherokee Neutral Lands in the southeastern corner of
the Kansas Territory. As the appellation suggests, however, Grandpa
Bob was not supposed to be there. The Neutral Lands-a twenty-fivemile-wide strip of land extending along fifty miles of the Missouri
border north of the Oklahoma-Kansas state line-were established as
a buffer zone between white settlers and Native Americans in an 1825
treaty with the Osage; the treaty prohibited all settlement in the area.
A decade later, another treaty conveyed the Neutral Lands to the
Cherokee Nation, again on the condition that it remain people-free.'
This prohibition did not deter as many as three thousand white settlers from moving there in the decade leading up to the Civil War. In
1860, the federal government undertook to remove them. Moving
north, soldiers burned farms and evicted families,' stopping for the
winter less than a mile from the Fowler settlement. Luckily (for
Grandpa Bob), the Civil War intervened, and the soldiers were recalled from their eviction duties to fight more important battles. During the war, another group of property outlaws-this time a band of
Confederate-sympathizing Missouri Bushwhackers and their Cherokee
allies-also sought to evict the settlers from the Neutral Lands. Over
the course of a month, the pillaging band drove more than sixty families from their homes before Union troops killed their ringleader, an
John Cardinal O'Hara, C.S.C. Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law
School. I am indebted to Notre Dame Law School Research Librarian Patti Ogden for
hunting down the details of my property outlaw history, and to my father, Tom Stelle,
for having the courage to break the family silence about it. I thank Tricia Bellia, Peg
Brinig, Rick Garnett, and Stewart Sterk for helpful comments and insights. Jessica
Latix provided excellent student research assistance.
1

See 2 KANSAS: A CYCLOPEDIA OF STATE HISTORY, EMBRACING EVENTS, INSTITU-

CITIES, ToWNS, PROMINENT PERSONS, ETC. 354-55
(Frank W. Blackmar ed., 1912) [hereinafter KANSAS: A CYCLOPEDIA] (describing the
history of Cherokee Neutral Lands).
2 Stadling Newsjrom Southern Kanvsas, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1860, at 2.
TIONS, INDUSTRIES, COUNTIES,

(279)
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unsavory character named John Matthews.3 Again, Robert Fowler
emerged unscathed (although family lore has it that he sent his family
to hide in a nearby creek bed).
My renegade roots don't end there. At the end of the Civil War,
the Cherokees ceded title to the Neutral Lands "in trust" back to the
United States. Soon thereafter, Secretary of the Interior Orville H.
Browning sold the land to his brother-in-law, railroad baron James joy,
for $1 per acre.' Outraged by the sale, the settlers quickly organized a
vigilante organization known as the "Cherokee Neutral Land League."
The League had two purposes: to promote the settlers' interests in
Washington, D.C., and to engage in violent self-help measures closer
to home. In furtherance of these goals, the Land League established
a "death line" along the Neutral Lands' northern border, threatening
to hang any railroad employee attempting to survey below it;' raided
railroad offices, attacked construction crews, and burned the headquarters of a pro-Joy newspaper; and used various tactics-including,
in at least two cases, murder-to dissuade settlers from purchasing
their claims from Joy.6 (My father assures me that Robert Fowler participated in League activities; I am afraid to ask which ones.) Federal
soldiers again intervened, this time to protect the railroad's interests.
Throughout the dispute, the settlers asserted their right to acquire the
property directly from the federal government under the terms of the
Homestead Act. Eventually, those who arrived prior to 1866 were
permitted to purchase the property from the government, although at
the appraised value rather than the usual $1.25 per acre. In 1870,

See Staflling News for Soulhern Kansas, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 1861, at 1 (describing
Matthews's reign of terror).

4 See PAUL WALLACE GATES, FIFTY MILLION ACRES: CONFLICTS
OVER KANSAS LAND
POLICY, 1854-1890, at 153-64 (1954) [hereinafter GATES, FIFTY MILLION ACRES]; KANSAS: A CYCLOPEDIA, sspinn note 1, at 355-56; see also Paul Wallace Gates, The Jlomestead

Law in an lnco'ngruous Land System, 41 AM. HiST. REV. 652, 672 (1936) (discussing the
sale in the context of the Homestead Act).
5 H.

CRAIG MINER & WILLIAM E. UNRAU, THE END OF INDIAN KANSAS,
118-19

(1978).
6

GATES, FIFTY MILLION ACRES, sn/na note 4, at 171-72; KANSAS:

A (CLOPEDIA,

supra note 1, at 356.
7

GATES, FIFTY MILLION ACRES, sipra note 4, at
176-77.

IId. at 188.

For a full account of the sale of the Cherokee Neutral Lands see id. at
153-93; KANSAS: A CYCLOPEDIA, siupra, note 1, at 355-57; and MINER & UNRAU, si/tna
note 5, at 116-21.
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Robert Fowler's son, George, purchased 160 acres from the federal
government for $500.9
My family's story will be familiar to those who have read Eduardo
Pefialver and Sonia Katyal's engaging article, Property Outlaws."'
Robert Fowler was, according to their taxonomy, an "[a] cquisitive outlaw[]":" he was a trespasser whose actions were "oriented primarily
toward direct appropriation."'2 Pefialver and Katyal contrast the selfinterested acquisitive outlaw with the other-regarding "[e] xpressive out
law[]," who trespasses as a form of conscientious objection, and the
"intersectional outlaw[]," whose actions commingle acquisitive and ex-

pressive elements. 3 According to Pefialver and Katyal, property outlaws are underappreciated because, in appropriate circumstances,
they serve both "redistributive" and "informational" functions.' That
is,property outlaws both catalyze "efficient orjustified forced transfers
of entitlements" and "draw[] attention to the need for reform.', 1 My
reflection on Property Outlaws focuses on two of the article's animating
assumptions about property and property laws. Most of my Response
challenges Pefialver and Katyal's repeated assertion that acquisitive
outlaws serve a valuable destabilizingfunction. The closing paragraphs
of my Response question their characterization of trespass as a relatively harmless form of conscientious objection.
Throughout their article, Pefialver and Katyal express concern
that property law's inherent conservatism and preference for stability
causes it to have "a greater tendency than many other areas of law to
become ossified and out of date."'" They reason that acquisitive, and
perhaps also intersectional, outlaws serve a necessary destabilizing
function, providing occasional "'shocks' to the system" that, in the
end, promote a new, more just equilibrium. 7 My intuition, however,

9 The abstract of title indicates that George Fowler purchased the
property, although the family's oral histoiy suggests that this purchase was orchestrated as a way to
get around the acreage limitations and that George subsequently transferred the
property to his father for $1.
10 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095
(2007).
11Id. at 1105.
12 Id. at
1102.
1 Id. at 1105.
14 Id. at 1103 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
15 Id.
16

Id.

17 Id.

It is worth noting that similar arguments about "ossification" have been
made in other substantive areas of law. See Henry N. Butler, Nineleeuuh- en)yJrisdti nat Competition in the (;rantivglof Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 132-133
(1985) (corporate law); Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, Who Sues or Di-
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is the opposite of Pefialver and Katyal's: it strikes me that acquisitive

outlaws usually respond to instabilityin a property regime, not the ossified hyper-stability that Pefialver and Katyal fear. Thus, while Pefialver
and Katyal are correct that acquisitive outlaws sometimes prompt an
efficient evolution of property rules, I suspect that the evolutionary
sequence generally proceeds from instability to stability, not from bad
stability to instability to good stability as they suggest.
Consider Robert Fowler. There was nothing stable about the
property rules governing the Cherokee Neutral Lands in 1856. Over
the thirty preceding years, the U.S. government had signed treaties
with two different tribes regarding the territory, both times stipulating
that it remain essentially empty.' It was clear, at least from the time
that the Kansas Territory was opened to settlement on May 30, 1854,
that this was a holding pattern-not a stable equilibrium.'9 Eventually,
any reasonably informed observer could have concluded that the Neutral Lands would be settled. The only questions were how and by
whom, although history strongly suggested that it would be by white
settlers, not Native Americans. In other words, squatters like Robert
Fowler did not destabilize a settled property regime, but rather sought
to position themselves as protected rights-holders when the regime ultimately stabilized.2' For this reason, I question Pefialver and Katyal's
assertion that the squatters believed that "federal land policy was patently unfair and unworthy of obedience."21 It would be more accurate
to say that the squatters believed that one possible resolution of the
uncertainty-the sale of federal lands to speculators, rather than its
direct transfer (for little or no consideration) to settlers-was unjust.
And, in the end, they reasonably anticipated that the federal government would choose to legalize their occupation, in much the same
way that families welcome the stability introduced when a courtship
turns to marriage. Better property in-laws than outlaws.

vorce? Fiom Faull Through Ficion to Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 76-82 (1976) (family
law).
" See KANSAS: A CYCLOPEDIA, syupra note 1, at 354-55 (detailing the 1825 treaty
with the Osage tribe and the 1835 treaty with the Cherokee nation).
,9 See GATES, FIFTY MILLION ACRES, supra note 4, at 48 ("No greater blnder has
been made by Congress than the one it committed in opening Kansas Territoy to settlement ... without clearly establishing the rights of settlers on trust lands and of Indians on diminished reserves.").
20 See id. at 154 ("Some squatters seem to have ....
hoped either that the tract
would become part of the public domain ... or that it would be sold in small units to
squatters as the Delaware, Iowa, and Confederated Peoria lands had been.").
21 Peialver & Katyal, supra note 10, at 1151.
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A similar story can be told about the practice of "titling" informal
property rights in the developing world. Now a standard international
development practice,22 titling was popularized by Peruvian economist
Hernando de Soto in his 1989 book, The OtherPath. De Soto observed
that in Lima, 42.6% of all housing was built on illegally acquired land
at the time of his studies. ' 3 He argued that squatters' informal (i.e.,
illegal) status not only deprived them of access to capital, reduced
productivity, and discouraged investment, but also forced them to rely
on entirely extralegal mechanisms for protecting their entitlements
and enforcing order. 4 To the extent that the squatters' situation, in
Peru and throughout the developing world, results from a colonial-era
land tenure system that favors a few large landowners, Pefialver and
Katyal's concern about an "ossified" property regime applies.2 But
many squatting settlements are located on public lands; in other cases,
the title is uncertain or disputed." In such cases, as Stewart Sterk
helpfuilly illuminates in a forthcoming article, the costs of acquiring
accurate information about the scope of property rights may themselves weigh in favor of an encroacher. Sterk suggests that when such
"search costs" are exceedingly high, liability-rule protection against

22 See, e.g.,
Jonathan Conning & Partha Deb, Impact Evaluation for Land Property
Rights Reforms 1 (June 26, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("The
World Bank alone committed nearly $1 billion In [sic] fiscal year 2004 to land administration, land titling and other land reform projects ....); .see alo, e.g., Jean 0. Lanjouw & Philip I. Lexy, Unlilled: A Study of Formal and Inf)rmal Poperly Rights in (Jban
Ecuador, 112 ECON. J. 986, 989 (2002) (examining a titling program in Ecuador);
Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of
Land Titling 1-8 (Aug. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing land titling efforts in Argentina, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Ghana, Peru, and Vietnam).
23 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH:
THIRD WORLD 13 (June Abbott
24

Id. at 151-74.

THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE

trans., 1989).

2, See, e.., KLAUS DEININGER, THE WORLD BANK, LAND POLICIES FOR GRO14-FH AND

reforming the Spanish hacienda system); Klaus Deininger & Hans Binswanger, The Evolution of the World Banks
Land Polay: PMiniples, Experievce, and Future Challenges, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER
247, 266-67 (1999) (discussing colonial land tenure systems as an impediment to reform).
26 See, e.g., Lee J. Alston et al., The Determtiants cud Impact oJ Property
Rights: Land
Titles on the Biazilian Frontier12J.L. ECON. & ORG. 25, 29 (1996) (describing the process
for squatters to claim title to government -owned fiontier land in Brazil); Rafael Di
Tella et al., The Formtion qf Beliefs: Evidence fiom the Allocation o/ Land Titles to Squatters,
122 Q.J. ECON. 209, 210 (2007) (discussing title uncertainty in Buenos Aires, Argentina
squatter settlements).
POVERTY REDUCTION 17 (2003) (observing the difficulty of
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encroachers may make more sense (from an efficiency standpoint) .7
And, interestingly, the example offered by Pefialver and Katyal of the
forced transfer of rights to squatters in South Africa reflects just such a
change-the court refused 2to
evict the squatters, but also awarded the
8s
owner damages for the loss.
Consider, finally, Pefialver and Katyal's example of "intersectional" outlaws-squatters organized by civil rights groups during the
early 1980s to occupy abandoned urban properties. Pefialver and
Katyal are correct that the campaigns had both acquisitive and expressive elements. But, tellingly, a central thrust of the squatters' message
was opposition to the inherent instability of the existing property reginie.2t) Decades of urban disinvestment had left our cities riddled
with vacant, decaying, buildings; many of them had become the locus
of serious criminality. Local governments owned many of these buildings as a result of tax delinquency and, even before the organized
squatting campaigns, took (initially unsuccessful) steps to establish
urban homesteading programs. The urban squatters, responding to
the same signals and incentives as their western forbearers, sought to
position themselves as likely owners when the government ultimately
acted to stabilize the existing property regime."
Pefialver and Katyal's belief that acquisitive outlaws destabilize set
tled property rules, rather than respond to unsettled ones, leads them
to overstate the value (and understate the costs) of their disruptive actions. Throughout the article, they suggest that property outlaws are
important in part because those excluded by economic circumstance
from market transactions have little recourse other than lawbreaking
to signal how much they value a commodity.1 The difficulty is that,
absent the uncertainty present in all three of Pefialver and Katyal's ex-

27 See Steward E. Sterk, Iropert, Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncerlainty About Property

Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 13-25, on file with author).
28 See Peialver & Katyal, supra note 10, at 1178-79 (discussing Modderklip East
Squatters v. Modderklip Boerdevy (Pry) Ltd., 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (CC)).
29 See id. at 1122-26 ("[T]he urban squatters of the late twentieth century
acted out
of an amalgamation of motives, not least of which was a desire to express thefir opposition to the government's failure to provide adequate low-income housing in the cities.").
See id.
A Id. passim.
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amples of outlaw campaigns, 32 the costs of forcibly redistributing
property from attentive owners to desirous claimants will almost always
outweigh the benefits. Property rules evolve slowly for good reasons.
Stable property rules provide important information, both to owners
and to those who wish to transact with them. Instability, among other
things, impedes market transactions and discourages owners from investing and improving in their property.! As Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill have observed, the need for stability is highest for dimensions of property rights that are invisible; the tangible attributes of
property-i.e., the metes and bounds of a parcel-are relatively easy
to ascertain, and there is less of a need to be concerned about third34
party information costs.
Thus, Pefialver and Katyal may be correct
that, on a very cold night, a homeless man will place extremely high
value on the right to obtain shelter in a shopping mall.! ' And, for reasons helpfully illuminated by Lee Anne Fennell in a recent article,
they also are correct that an acquisitive outlaw's state of mind does
send important signals about how much lie values the property lie
seeks to acquire.36 Even assuming, however, that on cold nights a
homeless man values access to the mall more than the developer who
owns it values her right to exclude him, granting the homeless man a
right of access would generate a host of difficulties. Outsiders would
not know which homeless people own cold-night easements, to which
mnalls, and under what circumstances; insiders (e.g., mall developers
and their financiers) would worry that future encumbrances would
devalue mall property, etc.
None of this is intended to discount the seriousness of the
homeless man's plight; rather, I simply want to contrast the likely destabilizing effects of ameliorating the situation through the forcible
transfer of property rights with the stabilizing effects of, for example,
titling efforts in the developing world. Of course, the story might be
different if the homeless man had been living in the mall since it was

2,

See id. at 1105-28 (discussing the squatters of the old American West, the luch

counter sit-ins of the Civil Rights Movement, as well as the urban squatters of the twentieth century).
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standaldization in the Law of'
Propely: The Numerus Clausus Princile, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 24-42 (2000) (arguing that
standardization of property rights is critical to limiting external costs for market participants).
'Id.
at 34.
M Peialver & Katyal, supra
note 10, at 1146.
.
See Lee Anne Fennell, Fh iet JesVass: Ie Casef "Bad Faith "Adverse Possession,
100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1065-76 (2006) (arguing, on efficiency grounds, that adverse
possession should be limited to intentional trespassers).
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abandoned-or seized by the government for nonpayment of property taxes-fifteen years ago. But these destabilizing factors are what
make Pefialver and Katyal's celebration of acquisitive outlaws too easy.
In each of their examples, a government granted title (usually to publicly held property) to small landholders-including, but not limited
to squatters-believing that the transfer would stabilize an unstable
property regime. As it turns out, this calculus was not always correct,
but not because the land grants were themselves destabilizing. As Michael Heller has noted, many nineteenth-century homesteaders' plots
were too small to be economically viable as farms and, because the law
required them to occupy the property for a period of years to perfect
37
title, "people either stayed and starved or abandoned the land.
Similar problems have arisen with titling efforts; many newly minted
owners find their tiny plots unmarketable and unworthy of credit
from mainstream sources.
The fact that urban homesteading has
failed to generate the hoped-for stability in city neighborhoods can be
blamed on analogous factors, or perhaps also on the circumstances
that made abandoned urban buildings essentially unmarketable in the
first place, including a high tax burden and property regulations that
dramatically increase the cost of renovation. ''
I have less to say about Pefialver and Katyal's treatment of "expressive outlaws," which, at its core, presents an expansive theory of conscientious objection that I am ill qualified to evaluate. But I do offer a
word of caution about their conviction that trespass is a "safe" form of
conscientious objection because property crimes are relatively harmless. "' Pefialver and Katyal are right, of course, that trespass is a "minor" crime, at least in terms of penalty. And they provide a commendable example of peaceful expressive property lawbreakinglunch counter sit-ins during the early 1960s. 4' But, their broad gener-

.v

Michael A. HellerT, lhe Bouitdaries 0 Ptimate Propety, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1172

(1999).
See, e.g., John Gravois, The de Solo Deltsion: Peruvian Eonomitl Ilen'ardo de So/os

Ideas for Helping the Poor Have Made Hitm, a Global Celelrity. Now, i] Otly Thoe Ideas
Wotked, SLATEJan. 29, 2005, http://slate.com/id/2112792 (arguing that in some cases
banks simply are not interested in securing loans with poor housing; in others, the
poor are pushed out by the wealthy when the titles actually become valu able).
39 See geterally STEPHEN R. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS & GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS:
CONFRONTING THE REGULATORY MAZE 73-75, 90 (1978) (outlining the market effects
of building regulations).
40 See Pefialver & Katyal, sura,note 10, at 1135-36 (noting the "hierarchy
of values"
that places "bodily injury over harm to property").
Id. at 1114-22.
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alization about the "harmlessness" of trespass as a means of expression
suffers from two related flaws. First, not all property outlaws are
peaceful. It is just as easy-perhaps more so-to conjure lip examples
of property outlaws engaging in violent expressive conduct. During
the sit-in era, for example, other property outlaws expressed their
opinions by blowing up the homes of civil rights workers. More recent
examples abound: animal rights activists vandalize testing laboratories;", eco-terrorists torch new suburban developments;'/: abortion opponents bomb clinics." While I am sure that Pefialver and Katyal
condemn all of these activities, each highlights the possibility that
property outlaws can be just as prone to violence (perhaps more so)
than individuals engaged in other forms of conscientious objection.
My second difficulty with Pefialver and Katyal's characterization of
trespass as relatively harmless is that it conflicts with their first justification for celebrating property outlaws-namely, the fact that property
matters to people. 45 This conflict has serious, real-world, consequences. It may be the case that most trespasses are relatively minor
offenses, settled without legal recourse; the same can be said of most
family disputes. But, all the same, many of the most emotional (and
violent) interpersonal disputes occur among family members, and,
most wars are fought over territory. Property does matter, as centuries
of battles, large and small, to defend it show. Consider, for example,
the recent actions of a group of "intersectional outlaws"-Jewish settlers in the Gaza strip and the West Bank. In 2005, the Israeli government forcibly relocated over 9,000 settlers from the Gaza Strip and
select areas of the West Bank. Many of those settlers had lived in
those places since moving there shortly after the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War, in part to make a statement that Jews are entitled to occupy all
land within the borders of ancient Israel. The settlers violently resisted the government's relocation efforts, pelting soldiers with rocks,
bottles, and even pots of hot cooking oil. For weeks, the world
watched as soldiers dragged women and children, kicking and scream-

42 E.g., Phuong Le, Animal-Rights Group Takes Credil for WSU Vandalism, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 22, 1999, at BI.
4. E.., Steve Vanderheiden, Eco-Terrorism orfustijid Resistance?

tadical Environmen-

lalism and Ihe "War on Terrr," 33 POL. & SOC'Y 425, 426 (2005) (sumrnarizing activities
of the Earth Liberation Front).
44 E.g., Bolb Found at Wome N' Clinic, CNN, Apr. 26, 2007,
http://Nwwv.cnn.com/
2007/US/04/26/clinic.bomb/index.htnl.
45

Penialver & Katyal, supra note 10, at 1131-33.
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ing, away from their homes. This summer, the Israeli authorities returned to remove groups of settlers who had "reclaimed" their property by barricading themselves into abandoned buildings. All told, at
least twenty illegal settlements have sprung up since 2001. And Israel
has promised to dismantle them, in an effort to diffuse the tension
generated by the settlers' presence and to prevent violent retribution
by radical 7 Palestinians who also claim the right to occupy the disputed
territory."
In the end, I agree with much of what Pefialver and Katyal have to
say about property outlaws: they do send important signals, both intentionally and as a byproduct of their selfish acquisitive actions. And,
they sometimes force an efficient redistribution of resources. But I
worry that their analysis proceeds from at least two incorrect assumptions about the special significance of property lawbreaking, namely
that acquisitive outlaws are a destabilizing force and that trespass is a
relatively harmless form of conscientious objection. When these assumptions are stripped away, their celebration of property outlaws
loses some of its dramatic force.

Preferred Citation: Nicole Stelle Garnett, Response, Property In-laws,
156 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 279 (2007),
http://www.pennumbra.comn/responses/12-2007/Garnett.pd

46 See,

e.g., Steven Erlanger, Police Jght To Remove West Bank Settle.s, N.Y.

TIMES,

Aug. 8, 2007, at AI0; Greg Myre, Thousands qt Settlers Remain in Gaza, Defing Israeli ,=
ders; Aililao
, Moves in, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005, at Al.
47 See, e.,'., Dina Kraft, Thodsands q" Settlers Return
to West Bank own, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2007, at A9; Jennifer Medina, Settlers' Deiance Reflects Postwar Lraeli Chaiges,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2007, at Al.

